There was a great deal of anticipation about President Obama’s participation in the recent conference on cybersecurity at Stanford University, in the heart of Silicon Valley, where he met with high-tech company executives last week.
It wasn’t a shocking surprise, however, that the Government’s proposal, to be enshrined into a Presidential Order, in reality only boils down to a call for sharing misery tales between the Government and private companies. Once the political rhetoric is stripped away this approach doesn’t offer any improvement in cyber security. The reality is that hacks are usually discovered months or even years after the fact, when all the damage has already been done. That’s assuming the hack is even detected in the first place.
It’s not the best kept secret in town that most hacks, and certainly the most dangerous ones, are rarely or never detected, or only long after the fact. A great example is the recently announced international multi-bank hack that netted somewhere between $300 million and $1 billion to the unknown attackers. See http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/15/world/bank-hackers-steal-millions-via-malware.html?emc=edit_th_20150215&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=58721173&_r=0
The vagueness in the loss assessment speaks very loudly to how little the cyber security experts involved know about the hack even now. And, of course, they haven’t a clue as to who did it. Not to mention that it took them two years to discover the loss.
On the more optimistic side there is a rising public awareness of the problem that sooner or later will lead to a public demand for the development of a true cyber security technology. Unfortunately, this is unlikely before the pain from cyber attacks becomes really intolerable, probably as a result of a massive loss of human life.
Tag Archive for cyber security
There was a great deal of anticipation about President Obama’s participation in the recent conference on cybersecurity at Stanford University, in the heart of Silicon Valley, where he met with high-tech company executives last week.
Once in a while we see a common cyber call to arms: “Let’s use data encryption and, voila, our problems will be over.” A typical example of this is the AP article http://cnsnews.com/news/article/no-encryption-standard-raises-health-care-privacy-questions.
This is a very common misconception. Encryption per se does not protect against hacking. Surely, encrypted files look impressive, with their very long strings of seemingly random characters. It must be mindboggling for a casual observer to imagine that anyone can actually decipher that without the secret key.
However, the reality is vastly different.
Strength of encryption is based on two main ingredients – the encryption algorithm and the secret key. Most encryption algorithms, and certainly all commercially available algorithms, are well known. They have been researched, and solutions—the ability to decrypt them without the secret key—have been found for most of them. The only undefeated algorithm so far remains the so-called “one time pad,” where the key is used only once. But even that algorithm’s strength rests on the quality and security of the key — issues that are far from trivial.
However, the main practical problem with encryption is the distribution system for the key. As in the example of a health system cited above, we are talking about a massive database with many millions of records. Sure, it’s not too difficult to encrypt all that data. But then what? The database has many legitimate users, sometimes thousands, and each one of them must have the secret key. It’s not difficult to obtain the key, one way or another, from at least one of them. Such a single breach would defeat the whole encryption scheme. I’ve often heard someone proudly declaring at a party, “I encrypt all data files in my computer.” Sometimes I will casually ask, “But where do you keep your key?” The answer invariably is, “In the computer.” Usually that person doesn’t understand that the key in his computer is also available to anyone who bothers to hack into his computer.
All in all, data encryption is a good concept, but the practicality of its deployment in databases with many users can only protect against middleschoolers. It would have marginal protection against smart highschoolers, and it would certainly be fruitless against professional cyber attackers.
Encryption per se would be just another expensive exercise in wishful thinking. It should be clearly understood: ENCRYPTION PER SE DOESNOT PROTECT AGAINST HACKING.
Whenever we make a journey, physical or otherwise, it’s important to understand where we are before we decide what direction to take. Otherwise we’ll get nowhere. This is as true as ever in cybersecurity.
Russian cybersecurity portal cybersecurity.ru, citing security research company Group-IB, recently stated that only 3% of cyberattacks are detected and countered by bank IT experts. This conclusion notably relates to institutions that boast superior protection against cyber attacks. Mere mortals are obviously less successful.
That 3% is a significant drop from the 10% average attack detection reported by a similar British study a decade ago. More important, this is startling evidence of our deepening cyber security misery. What’s really vital here is for us to recognize the reality. And that reality is frightening. All these almost daily proud statements of detected “sophisticated cyber attacks,” usually followed by bravado announcements that the attack has been defeated and from now on the particular company is reliably protected, are nothing but wishful thinking.
Even if these optimistic announcements were true, the reality is that they’re based on just 3% of cyber attacks. Furthermore, these 3% represent the least sophisticated, often clumsy attacks, while the better than 97% of the attacks go undetected — and we have no idea what they are, nor what we lost in those attacks.
Until we acknowledge the reality of where we actually are in cybersecurity, we’re getting nowhere, faster and faster.
Announcements by major companies and Government organizations that they’ve been hacked and have lost millions of private records that we entrusted to them are now as routine as the morning weather forecast on TV news. These announcements are usually followed by an assurance that from now on everything will be just fine, along with an urgent request that everyone change their passwords. Requirements for the passwords are getting more sophisticated – instead of a plain four-letter word they are supposed to be a little longer and include some characters requiring the shift key.
This is totally useless advice for two reasons: one is that these “sophisticated” passwords are in practice just as easy prey for a modern computer as the proverbial four-letter word, and the second is that no real hacker is going after your individual account unless he happens to be your curious next-door teenager or your nosy grandmother. In the real world hackers aren’t dumb. Why would they go after a few million accounts one-by-one if they can simply hack the organization’s server at the root or Administrator level and get all the data in every account with just a single hack? Any hacker worth his salt knows this, and this is exactly what hackers do – they hack the server, and that makes our individual passwords irrelevant.
These “change-your-password-for-a better-one” announcements likely have some other subliminal agenda. It looks like the real reason for asking you to change your password is to make you feel responsible for your data security. In other words, to blame the victim.
Furthermore, victims are majorly misled in a couple of other ways too. First of all, after a hack all your private personal data are gone, and they’re available to any criminal is cyberspace for a nominal fee. You cannot take them back. You can change your password, but you cannot change your name, date of birth, social security number, address, phone number; even changing your mother’s maiden name is difficult. All these are available to identity thieves.
And there’s another aspect that your favorite bank won’t tell you about: every competent hacker will leave a dormant cyber mole deep inside the hacked system. These are practically impossible to detect despite all political and marketing claims to the contrary. So even if the entire security program of a system is changed the cyber mole will report all the changes to its master. Including your new sophisticated password.
So a hack is forever.
The latest move by Kaspersky Lab is definitely intelligent, perhaps a little too intelligent.
Computer security vendors are beginning to offer integrated cross-platform security for Windows, Mac and Android devices, with Kaspersky Lab leading the pack with its Internet Security—Multi Device 2015. At first glance it looks like déjà vu, as good or as bad malware protection as any other on the market. However, Kaspersky’s has a new feature — it protects all the devices you own, up to five of them. Convenient.
From a business standpoint this makes perfect sense – uncluttering the security arrangements of your devices and bringing security to one simple point. This should upend the competition that is selling long lines of unrelated programs.
However, there‘s another angle here. The simple truth is that a security system for your computer takes over your computer, whether you like it or not. So when you have a bunch of different security products, each one of them controls only the device for which it is intended.
One of the most reliable means of accessing all data in a computer is via its security system. But, with some technical exceptions, the ultimate targets of most security or intelligence organizations are people, not their computers per se. This means that if someone wants all your data on all your devices, and chooses to do so via your security system, he has to have control of all your security systems. Not too difficult, but certainly cumbersome in a large-scale outfit. Inconvenient.
Here comes a great innovation: one-stop shopping for all your data – an integrated security system for all your devices. All your data can be obtained via a single security system. Convenient.
It’s not a big secret that Kaspersky Lab has cozy relations with the Russian Government and thus is a valuable resource for the latter. There was a lot of debate related to Kaspersky Lab and their relations to the Russian Government, someone even suggested once that they have a lot of customers and just one client.
I’d prefer to leave that to the reader’s judgment, but simply caution that in any case integrating all your devices via one security system makes you an easier cyber prey, and may be unwise, Kaspersky or not.
The media constantly speculate about what “Russian hackers” are doing against Western targets. Publications such as The New York Times are increasingly concerned about “Russian hackers” in the energy and financial sectors in particular:
The term “Russian hackers” needs some clarification. Cyber operations in Russia are conducted by numerous entities with vastly different objectives, resources, and constraints.
At least one distinct Russian military entity is tasked with infiltrating the critical infrastructure of potential adversaries, planting electronic/cyber bombs that can be activated when ordered, with a devastating result that would only be surpassed by a massive nuclear strike. This activity has been successfully carried out against the US for decades, and several generations of this malware are now sitting all over our critical infrastructure. Top American experts have deemed it practically impossible to detect and eliminate this malware. Welcome to the real world.
Totally different tasks are assigned to other Russian government entities. Acquiring technical/technological intelligence has been a traditional Russian favorite, and has become significantly more aggressive with the opportunities presented by cyberspace. This kind of intelligence can save a lot of research money, effort and time while providing solutions with minimal delays. In the energy sector this is particularly significant for gaining competitive advantage in world energy markets. The results are easy to coordinate since most of the Russian energy companies are government-controlled, which gives a great advantage to companies like Gasprom.
The financial sector offers a different kind of target. It attracts the concentrated attention of a wide variety of Russian hacking entities. This sector is simultaneously a part of our critical infrastructure, a vital resource for successful financial investment strategies for the vast amounts of various types of Russian money in the West (and East), and also a practically unlimited source of money to steal with little chance of being caught. Consequently, this industry is under attack from all sorts of hackers: government, corporate, and private entrepreneurial.
This brief breakdown shows why so-called “Russian hackers” should be differentiated, and as a phenomenon it is certainly not unique to Russia. The players involved differ vastly in size, resources, sophistication and risk tolerance. Taking these differences into account enable us to better understand the nature, origin, and objective of Russian cyber attacks.
“People are the weakest link in security” is an adage that has proven valid over the centuries. It’s also a common rationale for explaining cyber security breaches. It sounds like a pretty convincing explanation, but is this proposition really true?
There’s one important factor in these historical failures: otherwise good security systems—i.e. if a human being had not made a mistake, the system would have remained undefeated. That’s a fundamentally different situation from what we have now with our legacy cyber security systems. These systems are built on current technologies that have for some time been well proven to be thoroughly flawed. Virtually every firewall and router delivered to the first customer has already been hacked, and thus proven unfit for their intended purpose even before they are installed. The human factor in cyber security is only a very convenient excuse for the failure.
But clearly, the human factor is not the real reason for the failure.
Router vulnerability is especially critical because it can be exploited to perform “man-in-the-middle” cyber attacks that can very quickly cripple entire networks. Router manufacturers regularly blame their customers for failing to reset the default password on the router. Never mind that the new password would delay a competent hacker by just a few minutes at best. But officially it’s the customer’s fault and “human failure” is the cause.
Blaming the customer for equipment failure is not generally a successful business strategy, but, cyber security companies somehow manage to get away with it – perhaps because of the still somewhat mysterious nature of cyberspace.
There’s a very simple conclusion to be drawn here: currently available cyber security technology is not anywhere at the level where the “human factor” is the weakest link. The weakest link is the fundamentally flawed cyber security technologies that fail well before the “human factor” can even come into play.
So, stop blaming the customers. The real cause of the failure is the human factor of those who are supposed to protect our cyberspace assets with real security technologies but consistently fail to do so –while charging their customers heftily for products that are known to be unfit for the purpose.
In a recent Wall Street Journal article Symantec declares the current antivirus products dead and announces their “new” approach to cyber hacking: instead of protecting computers against hacking they will offer analysis of the hacks that have already succeeded.
This is the equivalent of a pharmaceutical company failing to develop an effective vaccine, and offering instead an advanced autopsy that hopefully will determine why the patient has died.
At its core this approach is based on two assumptions: 1) that developing effective antivirus products is impossible, and 2) that detecting damage that has already been done is easier than defending the computer.
Let’s take a quick look at both these assumptions.
It’s true, of course, that Symantec, along with a few other cyber security vendors, has failed to develop anti-hacking protection systems, because all these systems were based on the same fatally flawed firewall technology. However, that doesn’t mean such products cannot be developed if they are based on valid new cyber security principles. Cloning for one.
The second Symantec assumption, that they can detect the damage already done, doesn’t look convincing either. It’s hard to understand how one can “minimize damage” when the damage has already been done. Moreover, detecting damage, especially stolen data, is significantly more difficult than the task they have already conspicuously failed at. Modern malware is very good at morphing itself, possibly multiple times, into a variety of forms, splitting itself in several components and hiding in the depths of increasingly complex operating systems.
The bottom line is that it’s true that the currently deployed antimalware technology is dead– but this “new” approach is even more dead. The only likely benefit is that the participants will get a few billion dollars from the Government for their “advanced” research.
Conclusion: instead of offering a cyber coroner’s facilities we’d be much better off developing fundamentally new technologies. Essentially, new cyber vaccines.
Inasmuch as the recently announced hacking of eBay sounded like déjà vu, some aspects of it do warrant further inquiry. The company’s standard “we are dedicated to the security of our customers and are transparent” approach is plausible, but its customers may in fact be in less danger than is automatically assumed.
A common retail hacking usually ends up with a large number of customers’ accounts charged small amounts that go unnoticed for some time, allowing the hacker to accumulate significant amounts and, hopefully, cover their tracks. The relative stealthiness of this approach usually works well with credit card charges that don’t attract the attention of the customers. With this approach the major distinction between hacking of a bank, VISA, or MasterCard and eBay is that eBay customers are usually very involved in every transaction, and are likely to detect any discrepancy faster than during a casual use of a credit card. This makes eBay a less attractive target for a hacker – the probability of quick detection is a lot higher and the yield per transaction is still small.
Hackers clearly understand that, which raises the question of why they chose to hack eBay. Something other than the retail accounts must have attracted them to eBay, and eBay’s announcement that they had no indication of a significant spike in fraudulent activity on their site corroborates that. The answer probably lies with the huge overall amounts of money passing through eBay every day. I suspect that the hackers went after large corporate transactions with banks and vendors. There are very effective methods of hiding electronic theft from companies that are well beyond the scope of this post. Such methods can deal with large amounts and are assured a very low probability of detection for a significant time, enabling the thieves to cover their tracks. The key here is that with the high level of automation and the large number of transactions via eBay’s corporate network, hackers can reasonably hope for significant time before the transactions are scrutinized manually. The fact that “cyberattackers compromised a small number of employee log-in credentials, allowing unauthorized access to eBay’s corporate network,” and that the hack occurred “between late February and early March” and was detected only in early May supports this scenario. Furthermore, the accuracy of the attack detection and the time range cited suggest that eBay has only a vague idea of what actually happened and when.
All this tells us that eBay customers’ accounts are in less danger than may appear. Moreover, if someone gets your address, birthday, and telephone number, you cannot – you can’t take back and secure that information by changing your password — which does not offer much protection in the first place. However, eBay should take a very close look at its corporate finances from February through May of this year – they may be missing a few million.
With the pleasant long weekend over, now is a good time to check up on recent cyber history. It’s a common Government practice to release potential “hot potatoes” just before a holiday in the hope that they will pass generally unnoticed. So it’s useful to review the pre-holiday week’s releases right after the holiday. There is something there that caught my eye that I would like to address.
Interesting questions were raised by the following article, oddly published by an Australian publication on May 22: http://www.gizmodo.com.au/2014/05/hackers-broke-into-a-public-utility-control-room-by-guessing-a-password (“Hackers Broke Into A Public Utility Control Room By Guessing A Password.”) In short, the story is commenting on the DHS announcement of the discovery and fixing of a hackers’ break-in into an unspecified public utility’s controls. This raises at least two questions.The first question is why the announcement was made at all. Everybody who is anybody in cybersecurity knows that within the US-Russia-China triangle practically all internet-connected utilities have been penetrated for decades. Malware representing electronic bombs have been mutually installed by these countries and have gone through several generations of upgrades; they are ready to use, and extremely difficult to detect. Obviously, the most vulnerable side of the triangle is the US, since it has the most advanced and most connected network of utilities. The existing status quo in the triangle is somewhat similar to the famous MAD – Mutually Assure Destruction– of the Cold War, and the situation is pretty stable. So, if it’s not news, why announce it? This question can probably be answered by the second question.
The second question is: what has been left unsaid in the announcement? This is probably the key to the whole thing. The announcement mentioned “hackers,” with no hints as to their identity. But the interesting detail is that the attack was performed by a very unsophisticated “brute force” approach, which any hacker with a modern computer can do that easily. So, the only plausible explanation for the whole announcement is to tacitly acknowledge that some rogue hackers were able to penetrate a public utility, and to suggest that more such attacks may be coming. Obviously, rogue hackers of many denominations do not have the mutual restraints of the US-Russia-China triangle, and without such restraints they can do real damage.
Overall, it looks like the DHS is laying down the proposition that when some real damage is done, they can say that now anybody can take control of our utilities, as we warned you.