Tag Archive for government backdoors

The Government wants our encryption keys. Are home keys next?

The just released report by 13 well known cryptographers opposing the US and British governments’ sweeping demand for encryption keys has directly addressed the increasing threat of government’s insatiable thirst for power. Any government objection to this report is bound to be disingenuous.
However, there’s one more angle that begs for further exposure. The overall issue is not a scientific or technical question; it’s an ideological one. The frequently heard loud claim that inevitably we have to give up our privacy so the government can protect us is flatly untrue and hypocritical. It is indeed technologically feasible today to build a system where everyone of us would wear an irremovable collar equipped with cameras, microphones, and GPS that would communicate our location and immediate surroundings every instant “totally securely” to some highly trusted government agency. The government may argue that a) it would only access this information upon some court order; and b) it would solve a lot of crimes and save a lot of lives. True, such a system would make the police’s job very easy, would solve a lot of crimes, and save a lot of lives. But the real question is: do we want to live in that kind of society? In the American spirit the politest answer would be, “Hell, no!” And as always with this kind of hypothetical system criminals would quickly find a solution to neutralize it, leaving us with the situation that only-law abiding citizens would be subject to this massive electronic prison.
Even as we see deeper and deeper assaults on our civil rights and liberty in the manner described above, the government is more than a little shy talking about other intelligence-gathering techniques that require more skill than a slightly trained operator just pushing a few computer keys. These methods are well known among professionals, they have existed for a long time, and can be applied to any target. The drawback of course is that they are less convenient for the operators, require greater skills, and do not include a global bulk collection of information on everyone.
Well, maybe this is just what we, the people, need and want.

Cyber Backdoors: myth and reality

Every day we read articles on cybersecurity and privacy referring to “backdoors.” This term needs some clarification. I’ve seen all sorts of explanations of the term and its origin, including even linking it to Internet pornography. While the current situation in cybersecurity is certainly reminiscent of pornography, the origin and nature of cyber backdoors is very different.
The term is borrowed from residential architecture and means just what it says. It’s not the supposedly well-protected “front door,” but a relatively obscure entrance for casual private use, commonly having weaker protection for the residents. In cyber systems it’s exactly that: a supposedly secret entry point supplementary to the main entry point to a system, granting simplified logon procedures with deeper access to those in the know.
And that’s where the real problem lies.
First of all, any additional entry point to a network inevitably weakens a system’s security. The more entry points there are the more difficult it is to arrange and manage security. So, point one here is that even the very fact that any backdoor exists automatically weakens the security of a network.
Secondly, simplified entry procedures for the backdoors always mean they have weaker security than the front doors. For example, it’s not uncommon to have a backdoor to a network that creates a shortcut around a stronger VPN (Virtual Private Network) system protecting a front door, with the backdoor protected by a firewall that is always more vulnerable. So, point two here is that the common setup of a backdoor weaker than the front door always compromises the system.
Now, what’s the rationale for creating backdoors? For hackers, it’s pure and simple: it allows perpetual deep and undetected access to the system. The only risk is that it can be discovered and eliminated. So what? The hacker can simply make a different backdoor. With the Government it’s a totally different story; they seem to think that if a company creates a backdoor for them it’s for the Government’s exclusive use. The problem is that if a backdoor exists it can be discovered and hacked by anybody.
Believing that a backdoor is exclusive is fundamentally flawed. It’s as flawed as the wishful thinking in some government circles that they can develop a cyber security technology that they alone can hack. This is an arrogant assumption that historically has been defeated time and time again. You are never the smartest guy on the planet. Period.
So, in addition to all other issues involved in the Government’s pursuit of backdoor data collection, the uncomfortable but obvious conclusion is that by requiring backdoors they further weaken the already weak enough security of our networks, making them easier prey for any attacker.