All posts by victor sheymov

Victor Sheymov is a cyber security expert, author, scientist, inventor, and holder of multiple patents for methods and systems in cyber security. Victor Sheymov is a speaker on intelligence, offensive warfare, cyberspace, cyber security and critical infrastructure protection. Currently specializing in cyber security, Mr. Sheymov holds over 30 patents in the field of computer security. He has been granted patents in the United States, the European Union, Australia, Japan, India, Korea, and China. In a book Cyberspace and Security he explains how cyberspace is radically different from physical space. He analyzes the differences between the two, and defines the laws and characteristics of cyberspace. In a revised edition of Cyberspace and Security, Sheymov covers COHERENT DEFENSE OF LARGE SOVEREIGN CYBER SYSTEMS. Mr. Sheymov is the inventor of Variable Cyber Coordinates (VCC) method of communications.This method of communications is advantageous for establishing a high level of cyber security. By hopping IP address and other communications parameters, it provides dynamic protection of computers and computer networks through cyber agility.VCC method of communications enables building cyber security systems that render hacking attacks computationally infeasible. Furthermore, this method does not require intrusions in customer's information and systems. It provides security without violating customer's privacy or civil liberties. Victor Sheymov has 30 years of experience in advanced science. He performed scientific research involving guidance systems for use in the Soviet "Star Wars" missile defense program. Mr. Sheymov worked in the Soviet counterpart to the U.S. National Security Agency, serving in a variety of technical and operational positions. Prior to defecting for ideological reasons to the United States in 1980, Mr. Sheymov had been one of the youngest KGB Majors in its equivalent of the NSA, responsible for coordination of all aspects of KGB cipher communications security with its outposts abroad. After his arrival in the United States he worked for the NSA for a number of years. His work for the Soviet counterpart to NSA and the National Security Agency puts him in a unique position for a comparative perspective. Mr. Sheymov has testified in the United States Congress as an expert witness. He has been a keynote speaker at major government and private industry events such as NSA, a National Defense Industry convention, a National Science Foundation symposium, and he has been a guest lecturer at various Universities. Victor Sheymov is the author of "Tower of Secrets" (HarperCollins), a non-fiction book describing Soviet Communist political system, its repressive apparatus, and technical aspect of intelligence. His new book Tiebreaker, Tower of Secrets II, is the fascinating memoir of how Victor Sheymov figured out the reason behind the campaign to destroy him and his family, and the cause of the CIA’s catastrophic intelligence failures revealed with the arrest of Aldrich Ames. Sheymov then found himself at the center of the next intelligence crisis with the arrest of his longtime FBI liaison, Robert Hanssen. And now Sheymov, world-class cyber security expert and inventor, finds himself at the heart of the controversy over the solution to the rapidly growing global threat to cyber security.(Cyber Books Publishing) He has also authored articles in The Washington Post, Barron's, World Monitor, National Review and other national publications. He appeared in many national news programs including Larry King Live, 48 Hours, Dateline, McNeil-Lehrer, Charlie Rose and the McLaughlin Report. Victor Sheymov is a recipient of several prestigious U.S. awards in intelligence and security. Victor Sheymov holds an Executive MBA from Emory University and a Master's degree from Moscow State Technical University, a Russian equivalent of MIT.

What is cyberspace?

Some people view cyberspace as a set of computers and the wires connecting them; others view it as a source of readily available inexpensive information; others view it as a marketing space designed to facilitate their sales and increase profits; and yet others apparently view it as a target-rich space for committing crimes with little risk of being caught and punished. Instinctively, by cyberspace we generally mean the same recently evolved phenomenon, but we often imply different aspects of it. This may be acceptable for general discussions, but for specific work in the security field we need more precision.

But formulating a precise single definition of cyberspace is difficult at this time when we are just beginning to understand the concept. What seems to be clear is that cyberspace is an information and communications space. It is an abstract space. Indeed, cyberspace is where information exists and is stored, processed, and communicated with certain laws and rules applied.

Recognition of cyberspace can be attributed to development and growth of the Internet, but they are not the same. Cyberspace is a much broader concept while the Internet is a part of it. As consumers of information we don’t care if it is delivered to us by Internet through fiber optics or is flown in by a pigeon. What we really care about are things like its content, reliability, convenience and speed of delivery, cost, etc., i.e. attributes of information itself. We do not care whether our Internet provider is Verizon or Sprint, whether the routers used are Cisco or Juniper. This may be important to the equipment and service vendors but not us, information consumers.

This subject may look a little academic, but it isn’t. Proper definition of cyberspace is very important and has many practical implications.

Don’t Bother Changing Your Password

The news of the day is the Heartbleed bug. The mainstream media is full of the headline “Change your password. Hurry”.

Don’t. Just don’t bother. This is one of the daily occurrences of “major” cybersecurity breaches. The reality is that with this bug or the next one, the issue is not the bug, the issue is the password, as a concept. Any password can be hacked by a serious hacker with a decent computer in minutes if not seconds. How many times do we have to be hacked to get the message across  that we need to develop an effective cybersecurity technology instead of stitching patches on the constantly punctured bubble of the firewall?

Doing the same thing and hoping for a different result is not exactly the definition of intelligence. We’ve been doing that every day for a quarter century and calling ourselves cybersecurity experts. It doesn’t  seem that qualification is deserved.

Fake Defenses

The popularity of the Internet quickly led to cyber attacks. We realized the danger and developed our defenses, largely based on variations of a firewall. It does not work, and never did; in fact, it has been mathematically proven that any firewall can be penetrated; furthermore, any firewall can be penetrated in an unlimited number of ways. In the high-tech world, if something does not work within three to four years in the mainstream, it’s dead. Remarkably, we have been clinging to the firewall regardless for a quarter of a century. Why? We did not come up with an alternative.

Instead, we engaged in a series of four nontechnical solutions:

  • Defense by marketing
  • Defense by politics
  • Defense by deterrence
  • Defense by semantics

Defense by marketing. Marketers of numerous firewall manufacturers did wonderful job. “Firewall” sounds solid and reassuring. Actually, “fig leaf” protection is a far more accurate description of the firewall technology. No matter, we kept manufacturing, selling, and buying firewalls, happily using the electronic version of the proverbial king’s clothing.

Defense by politics. As technical measures did not work, we started the second phase. We tried to contemplate legal obstacles to cyber attacks, both domestically and abroad, by pressuring other countries to “crack down” on cyber criminals. This approach was quickly proved largely ineffective and quietly stopped. The latest attempt to revive this approach was made at a London conference for cyber security at the end of October 2011, and it was promptly rejected by most participants, notably the British.

Defense by deterrence. Some politicians and generals fighting the traditional “last war” have tried to resurrect the Cold War approach of strategic deterrence. This is a spectacularly misguided effort. During the Cold War, we knew exactly who the offender would be, and the threat of swift retaliation would follow. In cyberspace this is not valid. We can sometimes, but not always, discover who the offender is. However, we can never be certain. In fact, often we don’t even know there even is an offender because we often cannot detect an attack that has already succeeded.

Furthermore, there is a wide range of a potential deterrence measures. At one end of the spectrum, a mother’s notion of not giving a new bike for a guy’s fifteenth birthday is deterrent enough. At the other end, for an al Qaeda terrorist, a potential death penalty would not be deterrence but a badge of honor. Who are we supposed to deter and how? Luckily, the idea of defense by deterrence was sent back to happy retirement.

Defense by semantics. Under pressure of the facts, in the last few years it has become possible to say, off the record, that the firewall concept does not work. This was progress—at least it was a late triumph for free speech. So the second nontechnical solution tried, incidentally usually performed by technical “experts,” was defense by semantics. A large number of new terms and acronyms flooded the market, and we came to a point where computer security lingo became an alien foreign language that everybody speaks but nobody understands. However, the facts were still pressing, and the danger has become too obvious to ignore.

Cyber Bombs

Victor Sheymov’s Blog on Cyber Security and Intelligence

An important and often overlooked aspect is that many computers are infected by malware well before this malware is triggered. It means that many of our critical infrastructure computers already contain “cyber bombs” that are waiting to be triggered at the time chosen by the attacker to maximize the damage. This malware is extremely difficult to detect, and on a large scale such detection is a practical impossibility. Furthermore, disconnecting computers from the Internet in most cases would be ineffective, since malware can easily reconnect the computer to the Internet if a proper hardware and a wireless access are present, and they usually are. So we are sitting on multiple bombs embedded in our critical infrastructure at the mercy of multiple unknown attackers.

Thus we are facing a grim reality that we do not fully comprehend, and not much has been done about it so far. Our vulnerability has not improved over the years; indeed, it has deteriorated. The technology of cyber attacks has advanced more than technology of computer security. Let us review how we got into this situation and, more importantly, how to get out of it.

Running out of Time

Victors Sheymov’s Blog on Cyber Security and Intelligence

As a country, we are slowly coming to the realization that we are vulnerable. We are almost subconsciously accustomed to knowing that we are vulnerable to a nuclear attack by a very powerful potential adversary; luckily, there are only two of them on this planet. We are getting used to the realization that we are vulnerable to a possible collapse of the globalized monetary system. But we have yet to realize that we are vulnerable to a cyber attack that could be more damaging than anything except a massive nuclear strike. The most startling fact is that such an attack could be delivered by an individual or a small group with a few thousand dollars and access to nothing more than the Internet. This aspect is politely called “asymmetric warfare,” but in fact it represents the failure of our security technology.

The estimated annual cost of global cyber crimes is $960 billion, but that is just a small part of the threat. Damage to critical infrastructure and major industrial assets can easily surpass that, not to mention the potential of massive loss of life. We are beginning to realize that a cyber attack can literally incapacitate our critical infrastructure. Cyber attacks can explode oil refineries and chemical factories, clog up our streets and make emergency services powerless if they themselves are still available, and leave our houses without heating and air conditioning—or even blown up by the manipulation of gas distribution systems. If this list is not impressive enough, it can be very easily extended. And the reality is that at this time we are not doing much to defend against such attacks.